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A Kantian Argument against World Poverty 
Abstract: Immanuel Kant is recognized as one of the first philosophers who wrote 
systematically about global justice and world peace. In the current debate on global 
justice he is mostly appealed to by critics of extensive duties of global justice. However, I 
show in this paper that an analysis of Kant’s late work on rights and justice provides 
ample resources for disagreeing with those who take Kant to call for only modest changes 
in global politics. Kant’s comments in the Doctrine of Right clarify that he thinks we need 
a coercively enforced global civil condition. But his work also contains ideas that imply 
that within such a global legal order there must be no extreme forms of poverty and 
inequality, and that the current holdings of states are by no means conclusive possessions 
without confirmation by the global legal order we have a duty to establish. Thus, this 
paper challenges the prevailing interpretation of Kant as a conservative thinker about 
global justice that is held, for instance, by the leading contemporary liberal thinkers such 
as John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, and Ronald Dworkin.  
One of the major debates in contemporary political philosophy concerns the 
question: what duties arise in the face of the existing absolute deprivation and 
poverty in our world? A major fault-line in this debate exists between philosophers 
who hold that this kind of poverty gives rise to enforceable duties of justice1 and 
others who argue that absolute deprivation only justifies non-enforceable moral 
duties of humanitarian aid. Advocates of the latter position include some of the main 
proponents of liberal egalitarianism such as Ronald Dworkin2 and Thomas Nagel.3 In 
                                                          
1 Among this group are Simon Caney, Justice beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005) and Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2002). 
2 Ronald Dworkin, “A New Philosophy for International Law,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 41 (2013): 
2-30. 
3 It has been argued that Nagel’s remarks on humanitarian concern for the poorest (“The Problem of 
Global Justice,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33 (2005), 113–147, p. 118) can be interpreted as to 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
http://ept.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/08/10/1474885116662566.abstract 
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their view, duties of distributive justice to beneficially eliminate poverty are not 
independent of the institutional context in which this deprivation occurs: both Nagel 
and Dworkin are explicit that if a certain institutional scheme (similar to that of 
nation states that exercise power in the name of and over their subjects) were to exist 
globally, everyone that lived within this common scheme would have distributional 
obligations toward all others subject to the same scheme. However, currently there is 
no coercive international institutional context of the sort that would generate (either 
egalitarian or weaker) distributive duties of justice. Further, Nagel,4 Dworkin,5 and 
John Rawls6 all deny with reference to the work of Immanuel Kant that there is a 
duty to establish such an institutional scheme.7 
In agreement with this last point, Katrin Flikschuh8 has argued that from a 
Kantian perspective the idea of a coercive supra-national institution is a conceptual 
contradiction and thus impossible. If these arguments are correct, global distributive 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
amount to something similar to Rawls’s ‘duty of assistance’ (The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 106). Nagel, too, would then accept some sort of global 
sufficientarian duty of justice. However, it is not clear how a distinction between domestic egalitarian 
entitlements (that are based on being a participant in particular social practices) and global 
sufficientarian claims of justice (that are not participation-based) can be justified. The Kantian 
conception of justice presented in this paper has the advantage that it offers one scheme of distributive 
justice that coherently applies to the domestic as well as to the global level. 
4 Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” p. 121. 
5 Dworkin, “A New Philosophy for International Law,” p. 29. 
6 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 36. 
7 In their rejection of the idea of a world state, Rawls (The Law of Peoples, p. 36) and Nagel (“The 
Problem of Global Justice,” p. 117) refer to Kant’s arguments in Perpetual Peace. 
8 Katrin Flikschuh, “Kant's Sovereignty Dilemma: A Contemporary Analysis,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 18 (2010): 469-493. 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
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duties of justice to fight poverty are either not administrable or (if we follow leading 
liberal egalitarians) non-existent from a moral point of view. What we have to hope 
for, then, is that those in a position to help fulfill their general but unenforceable 
duties of charity to come to the aid of those starving to death or dying for lack of clean 
water or health care. As a look at our world shows, the poverty-stricken should not 
get their hopes up too high that such charity will be forthcoming to a degree that 
could really enable them to escape their situation. In this paper I will show that from 
the Kantian perspective accepting the view that poverty merely gives rise to 
humanitarian duties is mistaken. Contrary to Flikschuh’s view I argue that – if we 
accept Kant’s theory of justice – we have a duty (a) to create coercive political 
institutions that span the entire globe; and (b) to eradicate any poverty within this 
scheme since poverty that undermines people’s independence renders any legal 
scheme illegitimate.  
In recent years there has been an increased interest in Kant’s political theory and 
its implications. Kant’s particular conception of rights as relational claims that 
contain the authorization to use coercion has been thoroughly explored in a number 
of illuminating studies.9 However, given Kant’s pessimistic remarks about global 
                                                          
9 See, for instance, Katrin Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); Otfried Höffe, Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political 
Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009); Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka, 
Kant’s Doctrine of Right: A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Elisabeth 
Ellis, Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2012); Pauline Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism. The Philosophical Ideal of 
World Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); and Helga Varden, “Kant’s Non-
Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy: How Public Right ‘concludes’ Private Right in the 
“Doctrine of Right”, Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 331-351. 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
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institutions in Perpetual Peace, and the fact that his theory of Right does not dictate 
any particular scheme of rights, the resources contained in his late work on justice 
and rights (see his Doctrine of Right) for addressing the issue of global poverty have 
not been utilizes. It is the aim of this paper to redress this deficiency.10 Living in a 
world of almost exclusively absolutistic governments, Kant’s primary concern in his 
theory of Right certainly was not with the idea of a global legal order but rather with 
criticizing the despotic governments of the states that existed at that time, and with 
theorizing what a just order would have to look like at the domestic level. But given 
that his work does include concepts and remarks that point toward the idea of a 
global scheme of rights as the full realization of a rightful condition for all of 
humanity, working out the contours of this idea is a legitimate project in its own 
right, which (as will become clear) also has the virtue of lending greater coherence to 
his theory of justice as a whole.    
My argument proceeds in the following way: in the first section I will briefly 
outline the main aspects of Kant’s theory of Right that are essential for the argument 
advanced in this paper. The second section shows how Kant’s argument for the duty 
to enter into a civil condition ultimately leads to the demand to create some kind of 
coercive global institution that involves the will of everyone. In the third section I 
                                                          
10 All references to Kant’s works refer to the Prussian Academy edition with Roman numerals 
indicating the volume number and Arabic numerals referring to the page number. Further, DR stands 
for The Doctrine of Right, PP for Toward Perpetual Peace, TP for On the Common Saying: ‘This May 
be True in Theory, but it Does Not Apply in Practice’, UH for the Idea of a Universal History with a 
Cosmopolitan Purpose, DV for The Doctrine of Virtue, and GW for The Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals. Translations are taken from the Cambridge edition of Kant’s collected works 
(Practical Philosophy (1996), translated by Mary Gregor, and Anthropology, History, and Education 
(2007), translated by Allen Wood).  
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
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explain why poverty is impermissible within the Kantian theory of justice. In a fourth 
section I then present the Kantian solution to world poverty that consists of a 
combination of the preceding ideas of a global civil condition and the duty to 
eliminate poverty. I conclude by arguing that, if we take Kant’s political theory 
seriously, we cannot think that our current global arrangements are legitimate nor 
that we do not have enforceable duties of justice to eradicate the worst forms of 
poverty that exist today. 
1. Kant’s Concept of Right 
Since Kant’s political theory and his concept of Right have been extensively analyzed 
and reconstructed in recent years, I will limit my discussion of his theory to an 
account of its most essential elements insofar as they are relevant to my argument. 
Kant’s concept of Right is of interest to anyone who engages with the ideas of 
political authority and obligation because he offers an explanation of how our notions 
of individual rights and coercively enforceable political obligation can be reconciled. 
Further, Kant’s theory of Right is interesting to all those who see a strong appeal in 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s idea that any claim to private property has to be justifiable 
to those excluded from the use of the claimed object.11 
                                                          
11 In reply to the initial acquirer’s claim to private property through mixing his labor with the claimed 
object, Rousseau replies: ‘who gave you your standing [...] and what right have you to demand 
payment of us for doing what we never asked you to do? Do you not know that numbers of your fellow-
creatures are starving, for want of what you have too much of? You ought to have had the express and 
universal consent of mankind, before appropriating more of the common subsistence than you needed 
for your own maintenance’ (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1992), pp. 97, 98). 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
http://ept.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/08/10/1474885116662566.abstract 
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Kant’s ethics and his less well-known theory of Right form two  independent, yet 
complementary parts of his practical philosophy. Whereas in his moral theory Kant 
focuses on the autonomy and the inner freedom (that is to say: the good will and right 
motives) of self-legislating individuals, in his Doctrine of Right he is concerned with 
the external freedom of persons and the conformity of their actions with the universal 
law of freedom irrespective of what motivates these actions. The starting point of the 
Doctrine of Right is Kant’s premise that people possess equal moral worth as self-
determining agents. As such, everyone has to ensure that their actions are justifiable 
to those whom their actions affect. This idea is captured by the fundamental 
‘Universal Principle of Right,’ (hereafter: UPR) which states that  
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in 
accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of 
choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a 
universal law.12  
The principle thus requires that none of my actions must prevent another person 
from exercising their freedom in the same manner. This is to say that we only 
properly respect each other’s freedom and moral equality if we do not violate each 
other’s justifiable claims to actualize our inner freedom in this world. For this reason 
Kant’s idea of right is coupled with an authorization to coerce others into refraining 
from violating our freedom: coercion is in Kant’s sense a ‘hindering of a hindrance to 
freedom.’13 The reverse of this understanding of right is that it constitutes an entirely 
relational idea: the idea of a right presupposes other people against whom we can 
                                                          
12 Kant, DR VI, 230. 
13 Kant, DR VI, 231. 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
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invoke a right claim. On an island that is inhabited by only one person there could be 
no rights.  
Thus, what we can rightly own as individuals in the absence of any further social 
context (that is to say: in the absence of any political authority, in the so-called ‘state 
of nature’) are our bodies: since we are the only ones who can occupy our bodies and 
because our moral agency is inseparably tied to our physical existence we do not 
wrong others by occupying our bodies and the space they occupy. We also have a 
right to defend the physical integrity of our bodies from the attacks of others. This 
‘innate right’ of freedom14 also ensures our survival in the sense that it prohibits 
others to take objects that we hold in physical possession with our bodies if these 
objects cannot be removed without injuring us.15 However, according to Kant’s 
principle of right our claims to possessing anything beyond our bodies are much 
more contentious. Because owning something excludes others from its use, and since 
no one has a privileged claim to anything besides their bodies, any further claims to 
ownership are highly contestable. Within Kant’s theory this distinction between our 
bodies and external things in consequence leads to the duty to create a state. That is, 
since we have to have a secure way of actualizing our freedom in the world (by 
owning something as property), but no person can ‘unilaterally’ create property 
claims that are binding on others, we have a moral duty to establish a civil condition. 
The latter is characterized by a general will formed by all members who are subject to 
a common authority to create and enforce public laws, and to adjudicate conflicts 
among the members. A civil condition thus requires representative government and 
                                                          
14 Kant, DR VI, 237. 
15 For a detailed explanation of this point see Ernest J. Weinrib, “Poverty and Property in Kant’s 
System of Rights,” Notre Dame Law Review, 78 (2003): 795-828. 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
http://ept.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/08/10/1474885116662566.abstract 
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the division of its powers into the three familiar branches (executive, legislature, and 
judiciary). Here I merely want to highlight two ideas contained in Kant’s argument 
that are important for the purposes of this paper. 
First, Kant does not deny that people can legitimately lay claim to things beyond 
their bodies in the state of nature. The idea of the ‘permissive law (lex permissiva) of 
practical reason’16 becomes necessary within his theory since, without the possibility 
of owning something, people could not securely make use of the very freedom that is 
protected by the UPR. However, everything that people claim as property by 
reference to the permissive law is not ‘conclusively owned’ but only ‘provisionally’ 
theirs. This is to say that general acknowledgement of a claim is required for 
conclusive ownership, and such acknowledgment can only be conferred by the 
general will within a civil condition.17 Contrary to Rousseau, Kant does not think of 
the general or omnilateral will as an empirical reality but as an a priori idea that 
becomes possible by the subordination of the members of the general will to a 
superior head of the civil condition.18 The subjects thus become subordinate to their 
representatives who can issue binding verdicts in the case of conflicting right claims 
of the citizens. 
Second, since Kant advocates a republican form of government,19 in his view the 
citizens ideally elect representatives who finally determine the citizens’ rights in a 
way that is in accordance with the citizens’ status as free and equal moral beings. For 
                                                          
16 Kant, DR VI, 247. 
17 Ibid., 264. 
18 Katrin Flikschuh, “Elusive Unity: The General Will in Hobbes and Kant,” Hobbes Studies 25 (2012): 
21-42. 
19 Kant, PP VIII, 349. 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
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this purpose Kant introduces the idea of the ‘original contract.’20 This contract, 
though, is not an actual agreement requiring the consent of the governed but a 
standard of how the state ‘ought to be’,21 that is: of the legitimacy of the laws made by 
government. According to this hypothetical contract, only those laws are justifiable 
that ‘could have arisen from the united will of a whole people and to regard each 
subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he has joined in voting for such a 
will.’22 As an example of an impermissible legal arrangement Kant mentions a ‘the 
hereditary privilege of ruling rank.’23 This example cannot pass Kant’s test because it 
is a scheme that excludes most from the pursuit of social superiority or a political 
career24 on the basis of a morally arbitrary feature (their social starting position in 
life). 
Crucially, for Kant the need for a civil condition in which our rights can be 
conclusively decided (and in which our conflicts can be arbitrated) is so pressing that 
we are authorized to force those unwilling to subject themselves to join into this 
condition: ‘each may impel the other by force to leave [the state of nature] and enter 
into a rightful condition.’25 Kant, that is to say, is neither a voluntarist about political 
obligation nor a typical representative of the social contract tradition. In his view we 
are under a duty not to offend each other’s moral equality by impermissibly limiting 
each other’s choices. Since we additionally have good reasons to avoid the uncertainty 
                                                          
20 Kant, DR VI, 315. 
21 Ibid., 313. 
22 Kant, TP VIII, 297. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See ibid., 293. 
25 Kant, DR VI, 312. 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
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and insecurity of merely provisional rights our duty to leave the state of nature and to 
form a civil condition is not conditional upon our agreement.  
Thus, the crucial idea within Kant’s political theory is that conclusive rights and 
the respecting of others’ moral equality and freedom are only possible within a civil 
condition. For him we do not need the state for protecting our pre-socially 
determinable property rights. According to Kant, we need the state to determine what 
is justly ours in the first place.  The question is just whether the demand for such a 
condition can find its ultimate realization and fulfillment within individual nation 
states or whether some lawful condition beyond these political units is required by 
Kant’s theory of Right. 
2. The Argument for a Global Civil Condition  
Exercising our freedom by making choices and respecting those of others gives us a 
duty to form a state with a sovereign government and courts - superiors that act in 
our name.26 However, the question necessarily arises whether the need to justify 
external possessions to others only exists among those living within the same state.  
Can a state simply claim some territory and the resources in it and distribute them 
among its citizens without owing anyone else a justification for its property claims? 
Or do states have to submit to the authority of supra-state institutions that can 
generate and enforce a global collective will that determines what each state rightfully 
possesses in the first place? 
The question of the limits of the sovereignty of states within Kant’s theory has 
recently attracted greater attention among philosophers. The traditional 
interpretation of Kant’s view on this matter is based on his remarks in Perpetual 
                                                          
26 Kant, DR VI, 316. 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
http://ept.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/08/10/1474885116662566.abstract 
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Peace.  Here he famously rejects the idea of a coercive global civil condition in the 
form of a ‘universal monarchy’,27 (in which all peoples and cultures would be fused), 
or in terms of an international state of nation states. In Perpetual Peace Kant 
recognizes that  
In accordance with reason there is only one way that states in relation 
to one another can leave the lawless condition, which involves nothing 
but war; it is that, like individual human beings, they give up their 
savage (lawless) freedom, accommodate themselves to public coercive 
laws, and so form an (always growing) state of nations (civitas 
gentium) that would finally encompass all the nations of the earth.28  
But such an idea, Kant diagnoses, is not realizable since the earth’s nations ‘in 
accordance with their idea of the right of nations, […] do not at all want this’,29 and he 
thus advocates the second-best option of a voluntary association of states. It is these 
passages in Perpetual Peace that philosophers like Rawls, Dworkin, and Nagel refer 
to in their rejection of the idea that we have stringent duties to create global 
institutions. Recently, Flikschuh (2010) has defended this traditional interpretation 
by highlighting the conceptual argument that underlies Kant’s skeptical view on 
global justice.30 In Perpetual Peace, Kant dismisses the idea of a coercively enforced 
common global order as 
                                                          
27 Kant, PP VIII, 367. 
28 Ibid., 357. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Flikschuh, “Kant's Sovereignty Dilemma.” 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
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A contradiction, inasmuch as every state involves the relation of a 
superior (legislating) to an inferior (obeying, namely the people); but a 
number of nations within one state would constitute only one nation.31  
Here, Kant’s main reason for rejecting the idea that states have an enforceable 
obligation to join under a coercive global civil condition (analogous to individuals 
who have a duty to form a state) is that as subjects to such a global order states would 
no longer be sovereign to the necessary degree. Being subject to the instructions of a 
higher-level authority (like coercive global institutions), states could thus not fulfill 
their crucial task of conclusively determining their subjects’ rights. But, as was 
pointed out, determining the just extent of everyone’s freedom and acquired property 
is the very reason the state is required. Thus, according to Flikschuh, ‘the juridical 
compulsion of states would compromise their moral personality.’32 
However, this argument for the untouchable sovereignty and moral value of 
states obviously depends on the idea that states are in fact best placed (or capable at 
all) to fulfil their tasks and that there is no feasible alternative arrangement that could 
better achieve the same purposes. It is thus a legitimate question to ask whether 
Kant’s conceptual arguments about the need for indivisible authority hold up to 
empirical scrutiny and commentators like Thomas Pogge have criticized Kant by 
arguing that they do not.33 However, there is also a number of Kant scholars that 
offer a different interpretation of Kant’s view on global justice, which they derive 
                                                          
31 Kant, PP VIII, 354. 
32 Flikschuh, “Kant's Sovereignty Dilemma,” p. 480. Pauline Kleingeld (Kant and Cosmopolitanism) 
agrees with this view that, to protect their special moral worth as sovereign authorities, states must not 
become subject to the laws that are enforced by a supra-national authority.   
33 Thomas Pogge, “Kant’s Vision of a Just World Order,” in The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics, ed. 
Thomas Hill (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009). 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
http://ept.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/08/10/1474885116662566.abstract 
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from Kant’s later and most developed work on justice and rights – the Doctrine of 
Right.34 They argue that in this later book Kant acknowledges that establishing a 
global civil condition (that is coercively enforced by supra-state authorities) is not 
merely a desirable idea but rather a duty of justice that states have. That is, for them, 
Kant’s own writings strongly imply that the sovereignty of states is not as 
untouchable or efficacious as his comments in Perpetual Peace presuppose. 
Yet, hardly any proponent of the more recent interpretation of Kant’s legal 
philosophy fully explores the radical implications that his theory contains.35 
Commentators like Otfried Höffe restrict the purpose of the mandatory global legal 
order to the peaceful adjudication of conflicts that arise among states whose 
possessions are taken as given. In Höffe’s view, the problem to be solved by a supra-
national authority is the dissolution of the ‘residual state of nature’ that exists 
between ‘already established states.’36 Louis-Philippe Hodgson, too, argues that 
coercive global institutions could only supplement existing state power to solve the 
assurance problem among states:  
The authority the domestic state has with respect to its citizens means 
that whatever problem they face in having to share a territory is already 
solved. For all citizens of a state, in their dealings with one another, 
                                                          
34 See Höffe, Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace; Byrd and Hruschka, Kant’s Doctrine of 
Right; Louis-Philippe Hodgson, “Realizing External Freedom: The Kantian Argument for a World 
State,” in Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications, ed. Elisabeth Ellis (University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012). 
35 A notable exception is Lea Ypi, “A Permissive Theory of Territorial Rights,” European Journal of 
Philosophy 21 (2012): 1-25. However, also Ypi’s reading of the implications of Kant’s theory is more 
limited than the interpretation I offer, see footnote 55. 
36 Höffe, Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace, pp. 167, 168. 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
http://ept.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/08/10/1474885116662566.abstract 
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rights are already conclusive. If we are citizens of the same state, then 
there is no sense in which our rights with respect to one another are 
provisional – as if we could not really know which one of us is the 
rightful owner of your car until a world state was in place. Our domestic 
state already provides the answers to such questions.37  
However, there is a much more fundamental way in which states might be unable to 
fulfill the tasks they are charged with and that legitimize their existence. There are a 
number of reasons to think that states are on their own indeed incapable of even 
determining in a conclusive way the rightful external possessions of their citizens. If 
this is the case, states do not possess special moral value that would protect them 
from becoming subject to supra-national coercive power.  
The problem arises as follows: almost all interpretations of Kant to date assume 
that states can justly distribute those external possessions that are within their 
territory. But, we have to ask, why should that be the case? Or, to phrase this concern 
more in terms of Kant’s idea of right: why should people outside a state simply have 
to accept that this state justly possesses its territory and whatever it contains? After 
all, if I claim possession of a car, I do not only exclude my fellow citizens from the 
possibility of possessing the vehicle; I just as much exclude everyone else in the world 
from owning it and (what is crucial from the point of view of the UPR) make their 
choices with respect to that vehicle dependent on mine. Why should I be absolved 
from owing everyone outside my state a justification just as much as I do to my fellow 
citizens? And why should the limitation of the freedom of foreigners not matter for 
the assessment of the legitimacy of my claim? 
                                                          
37 Hodgson, “Realizing External Freedom,” p. 124. 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
http://ept.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/08/10/1474885116662566.abstract 
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We can better appreciate this problem if we consider what such a ‘national 
possession prerogative’ would mean from the point of view of Kant’s UPR. From the 
citizens’ perspective the prerogative implies that they merely owe each other a 
justification for their claims to property. Toward outsiders, though, it would be 
sufficient to explain that whatever citizens claim as property within their state does 
not require justification to outsiders. These outsiders can only demand a justification 
of claims to external possessions from their own fellow citizens.38 From the 
perspective of an outsider, though, there simply is no right to a justification of the 
property claims of the citizens of other states. The mere fact that they happen to not 
share in the united will of this other state is a contingent but sufficient reason to 
preclude such a right to justification. This situation, though, seems to be clearly at 
odds with the very idea of the UPR. It is difficult to see why Kant names the principle 
the ‘Universal Principle of Right’ if it is not intended to apply to all of humanity 
equally, and in its formulation there is no explicit restriction of the range of the 
principle to the freedom of compatriots: it does not limit the need to justify property 
claims to the borders of states. The principle rather suggests that such justification is 
owed globally (universally) and that property claims remain indeterminate until such 
a justification via a global united will is given.39 And this is precisely what Kant 
                                                          
38 Of course, it is normally permitted for foreigners to purchase property within another country. 
However, such acquisitions are contingent on the will of the state and if a state would prohibit foreign 
investment on the standard reading of Kant’s theory of right, this state would owe foreigners no 
further justification for this exclusion.  
39 One might think that this overstretches the meaning of the word ‘universal’ in universal law that 
Kant intends since in the German original he uses the term ‘allgemein’ – which can also mean general. 
However, Kant also refers to the Categorical Imperative as the method for determining universal or 
general laws (‘allgemeines Gesetz’, see Kant, GW IV, 421). It seem thus plausible to hold that the 
meaning of ‘universal’ that applies in the case of the Categorical Imperative (which requires that 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
http://ept.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/08/10/1474885116662566.abstract 
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unmistakably affirms in the Doctrine of Right – albeit in a few passages. When 
discussing the idea of public right that alone can render property claims secure, Kant 
asserts that 
Even if [the problem of the indeterminacy of claims to private property] 
is solved through [a domestic] original contract, such acquisition will 
always remain only provisional unless this contract extends to the 
entire human race.40  
It therefore seem clearly insufficient to argue, on Kantian grounds, that the citizens of 
a state do not owe outsiders a justification for the possessions they distribute among 
themselves within their state because these outsiders are not members of this state.41 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
maxims are justifiable to all people, not just compatriots) is the same as is the case of the UPR. We 
would need an additional reason to think that two different senses of ‘universal’ apply with respect to 
these two principles. 
40 Kant, DR VI, 266. 
41 There is another way to understand this point: if the UPR requires universalizability in the realm of 
external freedom and the Categorical Imperative in the realm of inner freedom, it is not clear why the 
UPR should only apply among co-citizens while the Categorical Imperative applies among all persons. 
This is importantly not to say that the UPR derives from the Categorical Imperative. As commentators 
such as Thomas Pogge (“Is Kant’s Rechtslehre a ‘Comprehensive Liberalism’?” in Kant’s Political 
Theory: Interpretations and Applications, ed. Elisabeth Ellis (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2012): 74-100), Allen Wood (“The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy” in 
Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretive Essays, ed. Mark Timmons (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002): 1-21), and Marcus Willaschek (“Right and Coercion: Can Kant’s Conception of Right be 
Derived from His Moral Theory?”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2009): 49-70) 
have pointed out, Kant’s philosophy of Right is best understood as an independent part of his practical 
philosophy. However, while the UPR therefore does not derive from the Categorical Imperative, both 
principles are rooted in the idea of the rational autonomy of human beings. The structural similarity of 
these principles is thus not coincidental: while the Categorical Imperative is a requirement of reason 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
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If we move from the level of the individual citizen to that of the community, the 
requirement of justification does not change. We might think, for instance, that 
citizens do not owe a justification for their possessions to outsiders because they form 
a people within their state. However, at another point in the Doctrine of Right, Kant 
also rejects such a community-based conception of distributive justice when he holds 
that  
Any rights of nations, and anything external that is mine or yours that 
states can acquire or retain by war, are merely provisional.  Only in a 
universal association of states (analogous to that by which a people 
becomes a state) can rights come to hold conclusively and a true 
condition of peace come about.42  
For Kant, states are not ends in themselves whose sovereignty can never be 
challenged. Rather, when seen in the larger context of his theory of nature and 
history, it becomes clear that to him states are necessary but intermediate steps in the 
course of the full realization of humanity’s moral and rational nature.43 States thus do 
not present the final political organization of humanity. Rather, as Christine Helliwell 
and Barry Hindress point out, for Kant the ultimate realization of human justice 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
that applies to us because for Kant we are self-legislating beings that have to take into account the 
legitimate interests of others in determining what actions are permissible, the UPR demands that we 
respect each other’s rational autonomy in the physical world by ensuring ‘the coexistence of everyone’s 
spheres of freedom’ (Marcus Willaschek, “Right and Coercion”, p. 67). Given their common source and 
the universalizability requirement contained in both principles, it is not clear why the scope of persons 
whose autonomy we have respect in determining what do to should differ.    
42 Kant, DR VI, 350. 
43 Kant, UH VIII, 24. 
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would require ‘a universal legal order backed by a power of coercion.’44 In his treaty 
of the history of mankind, Kant is clear that ‘the problem of establishing a perfect 
civil constitution is dependent on the problem of a lawful external relation between 
states and cannot be solved without the latter’.45 This is to say nothing less than that 
– until such a coercive global civil condition is established – no state or citizen can 
conclusively claim to own any external possessions at all (which outright contradicts, 
for instance, Hodgson’s claim above). According to Kant’s theory of right, non-
citizens can always challenge such possessions on the grounds that the property 
arrangement could not be justified to them since they had no opportunity to take part 
in the making of this arrangement, and their interests were not taken into account 
when the domestic scheme was set up. For Kant, our world of states represents a 
political order that reason requires us to overcome in favor of a global legal order in 
which all important arrangements are justifiable to all, and in which no one is 
excluded from such justification on grounds that she happened to not be a member of 
some state or society.46 This is to say that according to Kant’s legal philosophy, moral 
                                                          
44 Christine Helliwell, Barry Hindress, “Kantian Cosmopolitanism and its Limits,” Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 18 (2015), p. 32. Important in this respect is also Kant’s 
notion of the world originally instituting a commercium (a community defined by interaction and 
reciprocal influence), not a communion (a community established by human institutions; see Kant, DR 
VI, 352). The relevance of the idea of commercium is that it suggest that for Kant ‘human-made 
institutions such as territorially bounded states are historically contingent by-products of our 
haphazard efforts to come to terms with living “side by side” with one another’ (Brian Milstein, 
Commercium. Critical Theory from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2015), p. 108).    
45 Kant, UH VIII, 24. 
46 It is then a further question what institutional arrangement would best realize such a global order. It 
might, for instance, be thought that the best way to institutionalize such an order would be to leave its 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
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cosmopolitanism (the view that holds that ‘all persons stand in certain moral 
relations to one another’47) necessitates legal cosmopolitanism (the ‘concrete political 
ideal of a global order under which all persons have equivalent legal rights and duties 
– are fellow citizens of a universal republic’48) where this means that the fundamental 
legal order and property scheme has to be justifiable to all. Such an order can allow 
for more locally applicable legal arrangements (e.g. what sort of social services the 
citizens of a state want to maintain). However, these more regionally specific 
institutions are only permissible within the limits set by a global order that is 
justifiable to everyone (such a global order would, for instance, have to determine 
what resources states have for establishing their domestic institutions in the first 
place).49  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
coercive enforcement to the states that are subject to it. Such an organization would have many 
similarities with the way that European Union legislation is currently implemented in and by the 
union’s member states. However, while this is an interesting question of institutional design, this issue 
is of secondary importance in comparison to the argument this paper wants to make, namely that 
establishing a coercive global order is demanded by Kant’s theory of Right.  
47 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), p. 169. 
48 Ibid.  
49 A global legal order would also not necessarily require the establishment of a world state with active 
citizenship for all persons. Instead, as Pauline Kleingeld argues, Kant’s cosmopolitan law (that forms 
an important (and irreducible aspect) of his idea of a complete world order and that regards the 
relations of individuals to each other) could be conceived of as ‘indirectly democratic […] if those who 
determine cosmopolitan law are democratically elected representatives who are ultimately accountable 
to their constituents. Moreover, citizens can exercise citizenship through engaging in public 
deliberation in a global network of overlapping public spheres’ (Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s 
Cosmopolitan Law: World Citizenship for a Global Order,” Kantian Review 2 (1998): 72-90, p. 85). 
However, what remains unanswered here is the question whether the mandatory global hypothetical 
contract is to be established between states or (cosmopolitan) individuals. I have no space to answer 
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
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Such a contract, it can be said, would fulfill a necessary procedural requirement 
for determining what can be justly possessed in this world, in the same way that a 
domestic contract is the precondition of social justice within a state (thereby 
removing the indeterminacy concerning people’s external possessions). Of course, as 
Kant diagnoses, such a coercive global order is currently not a realistic idea since (as 
was mentioned above) the citizens of the nations of the world currently are not in 
favor of such a development. However, assuming that forming a global contract 
would not be impossible for humanity (e.g. that human psychology is incapable of 
generating the required solidarity and thus prevents people from agreeing to such an 
arrangement), what reason requires is not dictated by what is popular among people 
now or what has been popular for centuries. 
Accordingly, in the Doctrine of Right, coercively enforced legal schemes at the 
domestic, the inter-national, and the cosmopolitan (inter-citizen) level form 
necessarily complementary aspects of a complete scheme of rights: ‘if the principle of 
outer freedom limited by law is lacking in any one of these three possible forms of 
rightful condition, the framework of all the others in unavoidably undermined and 
must finally collapse.’50 Thus the relevant difference between Perpetual Peace and 
the Doctrine of Right is not Kant’s change of heart about the realizability of the 
ultimate end of the principle of right – a global coercive civil condition (there is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
this question but think that - given our world of states – an initial contract of this sort would have to be 
created between states for practical reasons. I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pressing me 
on this point.     
50 Kant, DR VI, 311. 
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textual evidence that he did not change his view in this regard51). Rather, in the 
Doctrine of Right, Kant no longer speaks of the idea of a coercively enforced universal 
legal condition as a conceptual contradiction but as the ideal final end of the 
‘Principle of Right’ (which is, from his perspective, possibly unrealizable). Kant’s 
abandonment of the thought that a coercive global condition would be a conceptual 
contradiction follows from his claim that states are unable to determine conclusively 
the rights of their citizens: if states are unable to fulfill this task, their complete 
sovereignty (which would be justified by fulfilling this function) is not necessary 
either.  
For Kant, the most basic external thing that persons can owe is land since ‘in a 
practical sense no one can have what is movable on a piece of land as his own unless 
he is assumed to be already in rightful possession of the land.’52 With respect to some 
of the most pressing problems humanity faces today, though, we might have to 
modify this focus on land and territory. Territory and land remain, of course, 
important53 but there are resources that are important for options that persons have 
to have that are not directly tied to the possession of land. First, there are resources 
that are fugacious (such as freshwater and fish) and possession of territory or land 
does not necessarily give a person a claim to these movable resources.54 Second, there 
                                                          
51 Kant, DR VI, 350. However, for an argument that Kant indeed changed his mind in this respect see 
Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka, “From the State of Nature to the Juridical State of States,” Law and 
Philosophy 27 (2008): 599-641. 
52 Kant, DR VI, 261. 
53 See Lea Ypi (“A Permissive Theory of Territorial Rights,” pp. 7, 8) and Arthur Ripstein (Force and 
Freedom, pp. 261-266). 
54 For this point, see also Chris Armstrong, “Justice and attachment to natural resources,” Journal of 
Political Philosophy 21 (2013): 1-18. 
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are still currently unowned resources (for instance on the bottom of the oceans or the 
artic) that would pose a tremendous problem for the UPR if it is understood to take 
national possessions as given. On the one hand, the principle would not require that 
outsiders are given a justification for what states possess within their territory. On the 
other hand, though, the principle would seem to require that unrelated persons owe 
each other a justification for the acquisition of unowned resources. Thus, also the 
question of unowned resources highlights two ways in which the traditional 
understanding of the UPR problematically gives rise to split moral obligations: with 
respect to what justification is owed for (nationally owned resources versus unowned 
resources) and concerning whom justification is owed to (co-nationals versus 
outsiders). Third, the determining challenge of our age, climate change, shows very 
clearly that there are resources (such as a clean and stable atmosphere) that are vital 
for the options that people have in life that are not tied to territory, and which people 
are not guaranteed if they possess some amount of land. As these examples show, 
Kant’s UPR cannot be primarily concerned with the rightful possession of land. 
However, the principle can well be applied to fugacious and unowned resources if we 
do not presuppose that whatever states possess counts as already justified external 
possessions. This is because, to avoid inconsistency, the examples of fugacious and 
unowned resources push us toward a reading of the UPR that does not draw an 
arbitrary distinction between nationally owned resources (for which no justification is 
owed) and these other types of resources (possession of which requires a justifiability 
to our co-citizens and outsiders alike). Thus, Kant’s UPR requires that claims to 
possessing territory or resources are justifiable to all who are excluded from them – 
which includes co-citizens and non-members alike.55 The unilateral property claims 
                                                          
55 For this point, see Lea Ypi (‘A Permissive Theory of Territorial Rights’, pp. 8, 21). However, contrary 
to Ypi the argument I make here for a coercive global civil condition is (for the reasons mentioned) not 
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of states thus have to be approved by some kind of global general will and cannot be 
accepted as authoritative without further scrutiny. That is, the territorial authority 
and property claims of states are always conditional upon their compatibility with the 
UPR.56 This problem cannot be avoided, as Arthur Ripstein intends, by treating 
states’ territory as identical to the bodies of persons that we have a duty to leave 
untouched even in the state of nature and in absence of a common authority.57 This is 
because unlike persons’ bodies, the extension of the territory of states is not 
unquestionable and thus this argument presents as a solution what is to be 
determined (namely the conclusive physical extent of the state). 
Consequently, the logic of Kant’s concept of Right gives states a stringent and 
enforceable duty to form a coercive global civil condition – a duty that is contrary to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
limited to claims of territory but regards other kinds of resources as well. Another difference between 
the present account and Ypi’s approach is that for Ypi, the need to justify claims to territory to all 
others is grounded in the fact that the Earth is finite and land thus a scarce resource (see Ypi, ‘A 
Permissive Theory of Territorial Rights’, p. 15). However, I argue, that Kant requires universal 
justification for claims to external possessions because in the absence of a global civil condition, in 
which such claims can be validated by a global legal order, these unilateral claims have to remain 
inconclusive since no one’s will is as such an authority for anyone else. Justification, that is to say, is 
not necessitated by scarcity but is part and parcel of Kant’s concept of right as such.  
56 It might be the case that, as Hodgson argues, a globally approved system of international law might 
recognize states’ claims of first occupancy and demands of non-interference (Hodgson, “Realizing 
External Freedom,” p. 117). However, until such principles are accepted by some kind of global general 
will and are deemed not to be the cause for states’ and people’s choice to become problematically 
dependent on each other, they cannot be taken to conclusively determine what is the legitimate 
property of states. 
57 See Ripstein, Force and Freedom, p. 228. Another author that argues for treating territory akin to 
persons’ bodies without convincingly meeting the challenge posed here is Kjartan Koch Michalsen (“In 
Defense of Kant’s Legaue of States,” Law and Philosophy 30 (2011): 291-317).  
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the views of Rawls, Nagel, and Dworkin. The force of this duty derives from the fact 
that (similar to individuals who are not members of a state) states themselves remain 
in an international state of nature as long as they do not subject themselves to a 
global constitution that determines everyone’s rightful possessions. But contrary to 
the views of recent critics of the traditional view such a global legal scheme would not 
merely have to regulate the peaceful adjudication of inter-state conflicts. The global 
general will and the coercive international institutional scheme we still lack also will 
have the task of determining what rightly belongs to everyone and every state in the 
first place.58 This is the radical ultimate implication of Kant’s idea of rights as 
reciprocally coercive claims that cannot be justified unilaterally, and that a common 
coercive order is needed to solve this indeterminacy about external possessions.59 
                                                          
58 We might think that the same goal could be achieved if states were to enforce strictly bilateral 
treaties regulating property rights. However, to ensure universal determinacy and conclusiveness 
about such rights all states would have to sign a bilateral treaty with every other state. Such treaties, in 
turn, would require a fair framework in which the bilateral agreements can take place and that ensures 
that the powerful states do not simply impose their demands on weaker states. Further, such a 
framework would have to include some form of world court for adjudicating the conflicting claims of 
the contracting states. Thus, it seems that such a framework would itself constitute a normative global 
order that has the aim to ensure justice and fairness and that has to be thought of as obligatory for 
states.  
59 Importantly, accepting this conclusion does not require accepting the further claim that due to the 
need for establishing a common global order, states are permitted to use any means they see fit (e.g. 
war) in the pursuit of this goal (as is argued by, for instance, Lea Ypi, “Sovereignty, Cosmopolitanism 
and the Ethics of European Foreign Policy,” European Journal of Political Theory 7 (2008): 349-364, 
p. 359). Instead, in light of the fact that some states already possess a legal order (even though an 
inconclusive one), those willing to establish a democratic global order might have to limit their 
attempts to persuade others to join their association to peaceful means like trade tariffs or embargos. 
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3. The Duty to support the Poor within the Civil Condition 
As is well known, Kant does not offer a detailed account of what distributive justice 
requires within the civil condition of the state because the concrete details of the 
legitimate property regime that is part of the legal order are to be largely determined 
by the people. Thus, even if we accept the idea that according to Kant’s theory of right 
justice requires the establishment of a coercive global legal scheme, there might be 
little we can identify in terms of necessary elements of this scheme. Kant is explicit 
that political authorities like states have the sole purpose of enabling their subjects’ 
freedom. Thus, such authorities can only exercise their power for the purpose of 
maintaining and safeguarding a civil condition but not for enforcing some particular 
conception of the good or social justice.60 That is, a state cannot force its citizens to 
do things that are not necessary for maintaining the civil condition as they would 
otherwise impermissibly infringe on the citizens’ freedom. If the state imposes any 
other duties it would exceed (and thus undermine) its own purpose, namely, to 
enable people to exercise their freedom.  
 However, within Kant’s theory of right, there are certain minimal 
requirements that any legal order and arrangement of distributive justice has to fulfill 
to be legitimate. If these conditions can be shown to plausibly include a ban on 
poverty, and the argument for the need to establish a coercive global civil condition is 
correct, this would show that from the perspective of Kant’s theory of justice, poverty 
anywhere in the world would be an injustice. While this is the argument I am going to 
make, we first have to understand that and why for Kant poverty is incompatible with 
justice. The Doctrine of Right contains a much debated passage that suggests that 
this is exactly the case. When discussing the powers of the state, Kant holds that  
                                                          
60 See Kant, TP VIII, 290; Ripstein, Force and Freedom, p. 223. 
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To the supreme commander [the state] there belongs indirectly, that 
is, insofar as he has taken over the duty of the people, the right to 
impose taxes on the people for its own preservation, such as taxes to 
support organizations providing for the poor, foundling homes, and 
church organizations.61 
 As is clear from the coercive nature of this duty, supporting the poor is not a mere 
humanitarian duty of virtue. Rather, it is a duty of justice that must be fulfilled if the 
citizens are to properly respect the freedom and moral value of their co-citizens. But 
since the authority of the state is based on the negative duties of the subjects to 
respect each other’s freedom, what gives rise to this positive duty (and the correlative 
power to the state to raise taxes)? As has been suggested by a number of Kant 
scholars,62 the power of the state to raise money through taxes to care for the poor is 
best understood as yet another way in which the state ensures the freedom of its 
citizens. Poverty poses a great threat to people’s freedom because it makes them 
dependent for their choices on the grace of other people.63 Since they do not own 
anything or anything much, their options to exercise their choices are limited in a way 
that is objectionable from the perspective of the UPR. Thus, the state has the task to 
correct such a lack of freedom if it is the consequence of a property regime that is 
                                                          
61 Kant, DR VI, 325, 326. 
62 See Ripstein, Force and Freedom; James Penner, “The State Duty to Support the Poor in Kant’s 
Doctrine of Right,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 12 (2010): 88-110; 
Allen Wood, “Kant and Fichte on Right, Welfare and Economic Redistribution,” International 
Yearbook of German Idealism 2 (2004): 77-101; Helga Varden, “Kant and Dependency Relations: 
Kant on the State’s Right to Redistribute Resources to protect the Rights of Dependents,” Dialogue 45 
(2006): 257-284. 
63 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, p. 274. 
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itself a social arrangement for which the public bears responsibility (this does not 
need to imply that poverty relief is a duty of justice were poverty comes about as the 
result unlucky or foolish as individual choices).   
Nonetheless, there is a possible problem with this interpretation of the powers of 
the state to alleviate poverty among its subjects. When we are part of a society and 
engage in cooperation and exchange with others, we necessary enter into relations of 
dependence with others: crucially, my freedom to own things depends on other’s 
choice because all our choices determine the price of pursuing formally available 
options. Why then, we might ask, are relations of economic dependence that can lead 
to the impoverishment of some morally problematic within Kant’s theory of right, 
which only entails the formal criterion of the UPR but no concrete required 
distributions? After all, poverty does not undermine the freedom of people if we 
understand this freedom in purely negative terms. Why should we not agree with F.A. 
von Hayek64 that Kant’s idea is that of a libertarian state that is not permitted to 
engage in redistribution and welfare provisions but whose only task is to safeguard 
the external freedom of its citizens with coercive means?  
The reason for thinking that the Kantian state is not merely permitted, but indeed 
required, to engage in redistributive efforts so as to eliminate poverty among its 
subjects is that according to the idea that claims to external possessions remain 
contentious outside a common legal scheme, property is a social construct that must 
be justifiable to everyone as free and equals. As mentioned above, according to Kant’s 
standard of political legitimacy, any political arrangement must be such that ‘it is […] 
                                                          
64 Friedrich A. von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty. Volume II: The Mirage of Social Justice 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).   
This paper was published by the European Journal of Political Theory and is available at 
http://ept.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/08/10/1474885116662566.abstract 
28 
 
possible that a people could agree to it.’65 Thus, Ripstein points out, according to this 
hypothetical contract test, ‘anything that could not be the object of agreement cannot 
give rise to enforceable private rights, including enforceable property rights.’66 
Consequently, there is no reason to think that people would agree to a property 
regime that would allow for some or many of them to end up in a situation in which 
they own next to nothing besides their own bodies, and in which they have no 
opportunities to exercise their freedom without the invitation of others – that is: a 
situation in which they are personally dependent on the will of others to an absolute 
rather than a relative degree. The possibility of such personal dependence is 
incompatible with the UPR and could not be the outcome of a united will of these 
people who respect each other as free and equals either.67 Thus, we can assert prior to 
any collective political determination of the details of social justice that under any 
property regime the state has the task to ensure that everyone has some minimal 
possessions that ensure them a minimal range of options to make choices 
independently of the will of others. The Kantian state therefore has to have the power 
(and its citizens a regarding prior duty) to ensure that everyone disposes over more 
than the mere means of substance,68 and for this purpose to provide publically 
funded collective goods like public places, health care, education, and equality of 
opportunity.69 Within the Kantian state, poverty is almost always an unjustifiable, 
socially generated injustice, which becomes clear in light of his remarks on 
beneficence in the Doctrine of Virtue where he states that  
                                                          
65 Kant, TP VIII, 297. 
66 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, p. 277. 
67 Ibid., p. 279. 
68 Allen Wood, “Kant and Fichte on Right, Welfare and Economic Redistribution,” p. 83. 
69 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, p. 287-299. 
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Having the resources to practice […] beneficence as depends on the 
goods of fortune is, for the most part, a result of certain human beings 
being favored through the injustice of the government, which 
introduces an inequality of wealth that makes others need their 
beneficence.70  
Consequently, even though Kant restricts the powers and the functions of the state to 
ensuring the freedom of its members, this is not to deny that his ‘account actually 
identifies issues of economic justice as lying at the heart of a state’s legitimacy.’71 
Kantian justice, that is to say, rules out absolute poverty and dependence on others 
and mandates redistribution where such dependence looms.  
4. The Kantian Argument against World Poverty 
At this point, the Kantian solution to world poverty emerges as a combination of the 
ideas that were discussed so far. If we accept the claims (A) that according to the 
original contract test, Kant’s theory includes a duty to eliminate poverty as a 
necessary condition of the legitimacy of any legal order, and (B) that humanity has 
the duty to create a coercive global condition to enable conclusive external 
possessions, it follows that no one must live in poverty anywhere within this global 
civil condition lest the entire scheme of justice and property rights be illegitimate.72 
The argument proceeds in formal terms as follows: 
                                                          
70 Kant, DV VI, 454. 
71 Helga Varden, “Kant and Dependency Relations,” p. 274. 
72 Kleingeld advances a similar Kantian argument for a duty to eliminate world poverty. However, in 
her view this duty is conditional upon the existence of something like a world republic and nothing in 
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1. We only exercise our freedom rightly if our actions conform with the valid 
claims to freedom of choice and actions of others (the UPR).  
2. While no one has a privileged claim to things external to their own bodies, 
we all must be able to possess things external to us so as to be able to make 
choices and to act. 
3. We may only possess things if doing so satisfies the requirements of the 
UPR. However, no one of us is naturally an authority for anyone else, and 
thus nobody can bind others by their own will. 
4. Given our need for external possessions and our inability to obligate others 
to respect our choices, we all have to enter into a civil condition such as 
provided by the legal order of the state and to submit to the state’s authority. 
Only thus can the state determine rights to private property that are not 
offensive to the value of the moral equality and the innate right of others. 
5. We can rightly possess property only within a civil condition.73  
6. The need to justify our possessions to others does not stop at the borders of 
our state. By owning things we also exclude all non-citizens from possessing 
the same things, even though we (or our state) do not have a privileged claim 
to these things. We therefore need to establish a global civil condition that 
coercively enforces some scheme of private property. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
that argues for international solidarity with the poor but rejects the idea that states have to create a 
coercive international scheme of justice see Howard Williams, “Towards a Kantian Theory of 
International Distributive Justice,” Kantian Review, 15 (2010): 43-77, p. 49.  
73 See Kant, DR VI, 264. 
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7. We can rightly and conclusively possess property only within a global civil 
condition.74  
8. According to the standard set by the idea of the original contract, no scheme 
of private property is legitimate if it allows for some persons involuntarily, 
and due to poverty, to slide into conditions that undermine their 
independence and moral equality as self-determining agents.75  
9. It follows from 5, 7, and 8 that we have to establish a global civil order that 
provides support for everyone who cannot ensure their own survival and 
minimal independence from the choices of others. Consequently, the 
existence of poverty renders any legal scheme that causes it illegitimate. This 
is true for the required (but yet missing) global civil condition as it is for any 
possible sub-scheme (like states) within this global legal order.76   
In essence, this Kantian argument against world poverty turns many arguments of 
current liberal theorists (who refer to Kant in making their arguments) on their heads 
as it leads to conclusions these thinkers reject. Among these conclusions are that (a) 
global justice and distributive justice in general require the establishment of a 
coercive global order in which all have an equal say, that (b) the current holdings of 
nation states cannot be taken as given but have to be either confirmed by, or revised 
                                                          
74 Kant, DR VI, 266. 
75 See ibid., 326; and Kant, TP VIII, 297. 
76 We can imagine a situation in which there exists a legitimate global civil condition that prohibits 
poverty and supplies all nation states with the resources necessary to guarantee freedom from poverty. 
Yet despite all these provisions such poverty might continue to exist in one of these nation states. In 
this case, the existence of poverty would not render the entire global civil condition illegitimate. 
Rather, the state that would allow poverty to persist within its borders would lose its moral 
justification.  
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as part of this global legal order, and (c) the fight against existing poverty is a matter 
of justice and not of charity. The fact that no coercive global order exists to date does 
not absolve us of our duty to fight poverty; the lack of such a global institutional 
arrangement rather presents yet another kind of injustice that is added to the 
existence of poverty and that is committed by those who resist the creation of a 
coercive global order. Thus, the Kantian argument against world poverty ultimately 
implies that within a justifiable global scheme much of the currently existing 
inequality would be impermissible.  
5. Conclusion 
If we follow Kant’s arguments in the Doctrine of Right, his theory of justice provides 
a definite answer to the modern question of whether states are under a duty to 
establish a coercive universal international law that requires the involvement of some 
sort of global common will. In connection with Kant’s idea of the hypothetical 
original contract, his theory also implies that existing poverty gives rise to enforceable 
obligations to eradicate this evil and not merely to unenforceable humanitarian 
duties of assistance.  
It is of course a prior question whether we accept Kant’s conception of Right 
However, everyone who accepts Kant’s political theory has to disagree with some of 
the main contemporary liberal egalitarian on three counts: according to Kant (1) we 
cannot reject the idea that there is a duty to create a global coercive scheme of law 
and justice; (2) there is no question of whether there is any leeway for us in fighting 
global poverty; and (3) the current holdings of nation states are inconclusive and 
subject to approval or revision by a legal order. The existence of poverty and massive 
inequalities that lead to personal dependence is unacceptable if we are to 
appropriately respect the moral value and freedom of others and to rightfully exercise 
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our own freedom. Within Kant’s political theory, the existence of poverty generally 
signals that we exercise our freedom in unjustifiable ways – regardless of whether we 
have already created a global civil condition or not. One additional implication of my 
argument is that the champions of liberal egalitarianism must either (a) forgo 
supporting their rejection of extensive duties of global distributive justice by 
appealing to Kant; or (b) revise their accounts of global justice. In the former case 
their works would be of less Kantian pedigree than is often thought. 
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